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Abstract When philosophers discuss the possibility of machines making scientific 
discoveries, they typically focus on discoveries in physics, biology, chemistry and 
mathematics. Observing the rapid increase of computer-use in science, however, it 
becomes natural to ask whether there are any scientific domains out of reach for 
machine discovery. For example, could machines also make discoveries in qualita-
tive social science? Is there something about humans that makes us uniquely suit-
ed to studying humans? Is there something about machines that would bar them 
from such activity? A close look at the methodology of interpretive social science 
reveals several abilities necessary to make a social scientific discovery, and one 
capacity necessary to possess any of them is imagination. For machines to make 
discoveries in social science, therefore, they must possess imagination algorithms. 
The question of whether machines could discover arose early in the history of arti-
ficial intelligence.1 Since then, machine learning algorithms have been developed, 
and there are now many putative examples of machine discoveries, for example: 
the BACON program discovering Kepler’s third law, Coulomb's law and Ohm’s 
law (Langley 1981); the KnIT program discovering features of a molecule im-
portant for cancer-prevention (Spangler et al 2014), and the Automated Mathema-
1 Especially in the work of Herbert Simon and his students. See, e.g., Newell, 
Shaw and Simon (1958), Simon (1977, 1979), Bradshaw, Langley and Simon 
(1980), Bradshaw, Langley and Simon (1983); Langley, Simon, Bradshaw and 
Żytkow (1987); Langley and Jones (1988); Shrager and Langley (1990); Langley, 
Shrager and Saito (2002); Langley (2000); Dzeroski, Langley and Todorovski 
(2007). 
Forthcoming in M. Addis et al. (eds.), Scientific Discovery in the Social Sciences. Springer Synthese Library .
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tician discovering Goldbach’s conjecture (Lenat 1982) (see also, e.g., Giza 2002; 
Gobet, Addis, Lane and Sozou 2014). 
A common way to frame the possibility of machine discovery has been func-
tionalist: if a machine can carry out some crucial set of processes, such as generat-
ing hypotheses, performing experiments, writing papers that pass peer-review, 
etc., it can discover. The thought is that scientists make discoveries with certain 
methods, so if machines can use those same methods, they can discover. This 
might be an effective framing if we want to suggest that machines can make some 
discoveries as opposed to none at all, but it won’t tell us much about the limits of 
machine discovery. By analogy, teaching a computer to buy a canvass, paint with 
certain brushstrokes and sell the painting to a gallery might justify the claim that 
machines can do some art, but this would not tell us what kind of art machines are 
capable of doing. To make more general claims using this functionalist approach 
we would require a unique, finite, and exhaustive list of the processes that consti-
tute the scientific method. This would bind the domain of machine discovery to 
whatever is discoverable by those methods. But there is no such list. 
A different kind of approach (call it “transcendental”) would seek a set of nec-
essary conditions for scientific discovery instead of sufficient ones. This approach 
presupposes that we do discover, and asks what makes this achievement possible. 
Applied to the case of machine discovery, we ask what capacities machines must 
possess as agents in order to discover in science. This begins in a piecemeal way 
since the features necessary for discovery in one domain might not be necessary in 
another, but the full account should provide the combined set of features necessary 
for discovery in all domains of science. Since I am interested here in the limits of 
machine discovery, I propose we look at the social sciences, where no documented 
cases of machine discovery yet exist. 
I argue in section 1 that we should characterize discovery as an action (a spe-
cial kind of event). In section 2, I develop this characterization of discovery. In 
section 3, I extract what is necessary for agents to discover in social science by an 
analysis of social science textbooks and methodology papers. In section 4, I show 
that the ability to imagine is necessary for social scientific discovery, and I con-
clude that machine discoverers must possess imagination algorithms if they are to 
discover in the full sense of scientific discovery (which must include social sci-
ence). 
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1 Reasons to Pursue an Action-Centered Account of 
Discovery 
There are many ways of characterizing scientific discovery,2 but each of them por-
trays discoveries either as events or objects. According to the first, the process or 
act of discovery is emphasized. Think of Newton’s discovery of universal gravita-
tion: we typically emphasize what Newton did, and how he did it, rather than fo-
cus on gravity itself. According to the second, a particular object is emphasized. 
Think of penicillin; we talk about what it is and why it is important. We should 
not claim that only one of these is the “true” sense of discovery; that would be to 
introduce a false dichotomy. Inquiry into both processes and products can illumi-
nate the phenomenon of scientific discovery. Nevertheless, I will focus on discov-
ery as an event for three reasons. 
First, objects of discovery are not counted as discoveries until there is some 
recognition of those objects being discoveries, and this recognition takes place at a 
certain time. It makes little sense to say that penicillin was a discovery in 30 000 
BCE, or that it was always a discovery. The number 0, democracy, and Snell’s law 
do not exist in time, although they seem to have been discovered at certain times. 
The temporal element of objectual discoveries suggests that we might take discov-
ery events as conceptually primary to discovery objects, since events can be in-
dexed to times and this is not true of all objects of discovery.  
Second, the temptation to think of discovery as objectual is at least partially a 
result of scientific rhetoric. Since the foundation of the Royal Society, science has 
been portrayed as objective by removing the traces of particular agents (Schaffer 
and Shapin 1985). Discoveries are made by science itself, that is, by no one in par-
ticular, in order to distance those discoveries from the doubts that might otherwise 
attend them if they were portrayed as products of a practice carried out by biased 
and imperfect humans. This rhetorical move masks important agential aspects of 
science, and we need not take the mask for the face. 
Finally, the products of discovery can be anything from bacteria to equations to 
methods, and it seems far more difficult to look for commonalities in the set of all 
things that have been (or could be) discovered and ask if machines could produce 
them, than to ask what sort of action a discovery is and whether machines could be 
the sort of agent to perform it. 
So, what kind of action is discovery? 
2 See, e.g., Kuhn (1962), Achinstein (2001), Hudson (2001), McArthur (2011), 
Schindler (2015), and the entries in Schickore and Steinle (2006). See Schickore 
(2014) for an overview. 
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2 Elements of the Discovery Event 
I propose we distinguish the following elements of a discovery event: 1) an agent 
(who discovers), 2) an object of discovery (that which is discovered), 3) a trigger 
event (that which prompts the discovery), and 4) an act of discovery (the agent’s 
interpretation of the object, prompted by the trigger event). 
The agent can be an individual or a community, whose mind can be extended 
or distributed. The object of discovery can be an idea, a fact, a value, an entity 
(concrete or abstract), a process, a problem, a kind, an ability or a method. Any-
thing, really. The trigger event often takes the form of an observation, inference, 
experiment, simulation, model manipulation, statistical analysis, or combination of 
these. It need not be intentional and can even be accidental. Generally speaking, 
any event can be a trigger event. Finally, the act of discovery is the agent’s inter-
pretation of the object of discovery, prompted by the trigger event. In the simplest 
cases, this interpretation is a mere categorization of the object of discovery. We 
must not confuse the act of discovery with the trigger event, however. The discov-
ery of penicillin was not the Petri dishes left uncovered, or the mould growing on 
the dishes, or Flemming’s walking into the lab and seeing the area surrounding the 
mould in which there was no Staphylococcus. All of these objects and events 
jointly constitute the trigger event, and the discovery of penicillin must be differ-
ent from this event because we want to be able to praise a discoverer for their dis-
covery, and we cannot do this if the discovery simply is the trigger event, which 
need not include the intentional action of any agent. 
Interpretation is therefore the key action of discovery. I propose four specifica-
tions of interpretation that when satisfied (and combined with the other elements) 
yield what I think is a plausible explication of scientific discovery. 
First, the interpretation of the object of discovery has to be novel—whether to 
the agent (“personal discovery”) or to the agent’s epistemic community (“histori-
cal discovery”) (see Boden 2004. Novelty is also a requirement for Kuhn 1962, 
Schindler 2015, and Hudson 2001). An agent or community who discovers the 
same thing again still discovers it, but after the first instance we say that they re-
discover it. Something may be a personal discovery for an agent though only a re-
discovery for her epistemic community. And one epistemic community can redis-
cover what another has discovered already. The same discovery can therefore be a 
discovery or a rediscovery depending on how broadly we understand the agent’s 
epistemic community. Lastly, we should note that an interpretation can be more or 
less novel. 
Second, for an interpretation to count as a scientific discovery, it must interpret 
the object of discovery as the solution to a scientific problem. This is too loose, 
however, because a scientist who learns that her assistant has been stealing lab 
equipment interprets an object of discovery (the lab assistant’s actions) as the so-
lution to a problem (the equipment going missing) in a scientific domain. So let us 
focus on acts of theoretical scientific discovery, which are those that solve theo-
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retical scientific problems. Theoretical problems concern the phenomena studied 
by a scientific domain, while practical problems obfuscate our solving such prob-
lems. The distinction is contextual, but it will do for our purposes.  
Third, a scientific discovery must not merely appear to solve a theoretical 
problem; it must actually solve it. (Or partially solve it for a partial discovery). 
Thus Poincaré wrote that a mathematical discovery has three steps, an uncon-
scious combination of ideas, a flash of insight that suggests that one of these com-
binations solves the problem, and then the most important step: verification that 
the solution is correct.3 Since we do not want to discuss the mere feeling of dis-
covery (what William Whewell called “happy thoughts”), we must include some 
criterion of success (see also Achinstein 2001 and Hudson 2001). The kinds of so-
lution that count as successful for a given problem will vary according to context.  
Fourth, in addition to producing a novel and successful solution to a theoretical 
scientific problem, we require that the problem solved be significant. This is to 
preserve the intuition that discoveries are in some sense special; not all novel solu-
tions to theoretical problems are discoveries. A problem is significant when its so-
lution possesses some minimum value in whatever the relevant set of weighted 
scientific values are. Examples of such values include descriptive and predictive 
adequacy, coherence with previous knowledge, fruitfulness, beauty, and simplici-
ty.  
To summarize, scientific discovery events consist of an agent’s novel interpre-
tation of an object which successfully solves a significant theoretical scientific 
problem. A discovery is more or less momentus depending on how novel and 
complete the solution is, and how significant the problem solved is. 
Can machines discover in this sense? Trigger events and objects of discovery 
can be almost anything, and tests for a solution’s satisfactoriness can be pro-
grammed into computers in advance, so I will leave these to one side and focus on 
the question of whether machines can produce novel interpretations that provide 
solutions to significant theoretical problems. According to some characterizations 
of novelty, interpretation and significance, the answer will be, yes. As regards 
novelty, machines can do things that are novel (in the sense that they have not 
been done before) given the use of random number generators. Second, machines 
can interpret if by interpretation we mean categorization. In this minimal sense of 
interpretation, sufficiently well-programmed computers do categorize certain 
states as solutions by checking them against programmed desiderata. Finally, ma-
chines can have significance encoded into them, insofar as they are designed by 
scientists to address problems that are antecedently deemed. In sum, there are 
senses of novelty, interpretation, and significance that justify the use of the con-
cept DISCOVERY as applied to machine behaviour. 
3 He writes, “Discovery consists precisely in not constructing useless combina-
tions, but in constructing those that are useful, which are an infinitely small minor-
ity. Discovery is discernment, selection” (Poincaré 1914, 51). 
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But there are senses of novelty, interpretation and significance that will be 
more difficult for machines to satisfy. These can be found in many corners of sci-
ence. We want to know what is required if machines are to satisfy even the most 
difficult. Good candidates can be found by considering qualitative discoveries like 
those made in the social sciences. 
3 Social Scientific Discovery 
A broad range of methods are used by social scientists, from surveys and statistics 
to interviews and observations. Naively, we can draw a continuum from positivist 
to interpretivist social science methods. Positivists focus on observables such as 
physical movements and questionnaire responses, and explicitly endorse the more 
“objective” methods of science including standardized surveys and statistical 
analysis. They aim to draw generalizable lessons concerning human behaviour. In-
terpretivists argue that positivist methods cannot capture the rich complexity of 
human social life. To understand this complexity, researchers must be deeply im-
mersed in the target system and recognize that they can only present a limited per-
spective, at best. In light of this, interpretivists claim that their discoveries will not 
be widely generalizable. 
Insofar as positivist social science employs the quantitative methods of science, 
machines can make positivist social scientific discoveries if they can make quanti-
tative discoveries in other fields of science, and I assume they can. A harder ques-
tion is whether machines can discover in interpretivist social science. That is, can 
machines produce new interpretations of the shared experiences and meanings of 
agents as solutions to significant theoretical problems concerning how communi-
ties form, function and fall apart? The answer depends on the relevant senses of 
novelty, interpretation and significance, which can be extracted from what sociol-
ogists do and teach.  
It would be impossible to review the notion of discovery across all interpre-
tivist social sciences, so in what follows I focus on ethnography, which I take to 
be a paradigm interpretivist social science method shared across many subdisci-
plines of social science including sociology, anthropology, international relations, 
economics, and history. 
The ethnographic method discovers by means of field studies, which include 
participant observation and interviews. The main goal of this kind of research 
method is to tell us why people think and behave in the ways they do in terms of 
the meanings they ascribe to surrounding people, objects and events. For example, 
Rosabeth Kanter’s famous study, Men and Women of the Corporation (1977) 
found that secretaries in the 1970s had little or no upward mobility because of 
“trained incapacity,” that is, “training that makes people fit for one position [but] 
progressively less fit for any other” (1977, 98). The skills developed by the secre-
taries studied by Kanter were highly specific to the needs of their particular boss-
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es. While such specialization might have provided job security, it also ensured that 
bosses typically would not let their secretaries move into other (higher) positions.  
Another example is Annette Lareau’s Unequal Childhoods (2003), which fo-
cused on how differences in social class affect parenting styles among African 
American families. Middle class parents seemed to favour a style Lareau called 
“concerted cultivation,” according to which children are allowed negotiation pow-
er concerning their life trajectories, are put into organized activities, and are taught 
to question authority. Lareau dubbed the other style “accomplishment of natural 
growth,” which she found to be favoured by working class families. This style 
gives far less negotiation power to the child, but also imposes less organized struc-
ture on daily life. As a result, children are encouraged to respect authority figures 
while developing a sense of personal independence; both thought to be beneficial 
character traits in the context of working class life.  
The above examples are typical of interpretivist social scientific discoveries; an 
agent or team performs observations and interviews motivated by a few general 
questions, and interprets the data to find patterns that explain why certain social 
phenomena take the forms they do. Now, in what sense are such discoveries novel 
interpretations that solve significant problems? 
 
3.1 Ethnographic Novelty 
According to two widely-used ethnography textbooks, “A report may be perceived 
as new and noteworthy…in at least three ways: through theoretical discovery, ex-
tension, or refinement” (Lofland et al. 2006, 173; see also Snow et al. 2003, 186).  
The first, theoretical extension, “involves extending pre-existing theoretical or 
conceptual formulations to groups or settings other than those in which they were 
first developed or intended to be used” (Lofland et al. 2006, 173). There are diffi-
cult cases where it is not clear how to extend a conceptual formulation or how to 
determine what counts as a new domain of application, but in general this is some-
thing machines have been doing more and more effectively, especially in mathe-
matics (Lenat 1997), physics (Langley 1981), chemistry (Żytkow and Simon 
1986), and biology (Kulkarni and Simon 1990). We can expect this progress to 
continue, and it is only a matter of time before machines can apply existing mod-
els of human behaviour to new sociological data. 
Theoretical refinement is “the modification of existing theoretical perspectives 
through the close inspection of a particular theoretical proposition or concept with 
new field data” (Lofland et al. 2006, 173). Again, there is no reason to deny this 
sense of novelty to machines. If something like the dominant view in philosophy 
of science is correct—that theories are collections of models—then we already 
have programs that can analyze data to create or refine models, which in this sense 
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of theory, satisfy the requirement (for examples of programs that are capable of 
such novelty see, e.g., Valdés-Pérez 1995, and Kocabas and Langley 1998).  
These aren’t the most interesting sorts of novelty. Indeed, it has been argued 
that if computers are limited to these sorts of novelty, they cannot really discover 
(Gillies 1996). So let us turn to theoretical discovery.  
Theoretical discovery requires categories to be devised and used in a way that 
interprets and explains data. This could be novel because the data is novel, the in-
terpretation is novel, or both. For instance, we could use an old system of interpre-
tation (e.g., looking at power imbalances) to analyze a new social phenomenon 
(e.g., Twitter behaviour). Or we could look at old data through a new interpretive 
scheme. Or we could produce a new interpretation of new data.  
The first of these options can be achieved by computation as theoretical exten-
sion. What is interesting about the second and third is the production of a new in-
terpretation. To give an account of the novelty relevant for social scientific dis-
covery, therefore, we need to look at the nature of ethnographic interpretation. But 
first, a quick look at ethnographic significance.  
 
3.2 Ethnographic Significance 
According to Lofland et al., a significant ethnographic solution should do at least 
some of the following: 1) go against “common sense” or the “modern mind-set,” 
2) develop ideas that “establish broader implications,” 3) be well-developed, that 
is, use or generate concepts that are elaborated in detail, with a good balance of 
conceptual elaboration and data presentation, and a high degree of interpenetration 
between the two, or 4) refine or extend existing social science ideas (2006, 177-
181). Let us address these in turn with machine discovery in mind.  
First, because computers are not typically programmed to reason as humans do, 
they have always appeared to go against common sense and the modern mind-set. 
We might nevertheless worry that they have their own computer common sense: 
patterns of reasoning and expression that they cannot deviate from. Machine nov-
elty could then be thought of as the power to break free from such reasoning 
styles. This is something machines can do, as programmers regularly soften the 
criteria that define problem solutions and appropriate methods, as well as adding 
stochastic elements and evolutionary algorithms that encourage such flexibility.  
The second way of achieving significance, namely, establishing broader impli-
cations, is an instance of theory extension, which we granted was within the pur-
view of machines.  
The third, which Lofland et al. call “developed treatment,” merely requires that 
work be done “well”: a significant study will be well-researched, have conclusions 
that are empirically or theoretically well-supported and were arrived at using sci-
entific interventions that were carefully thought-out and cleverly brought-about. 
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To repeat, however, there is no (unique, finite, exhaustive) list of methods that are 
the “good” or “scientific” ones. The only list we can have is open-ended. So, how 
could a computer go about choosing the best evidence and the best methods, when 
we cannot say in advance what those are? The computer will have to answer these 
questions by interpretation. Given the theoretical context, methods available, and 
data collected, it must interpret one or some of the methods as the most appropri-
ate. And it must interpret one of the many possible explanations as the best or 
most plausible. In other words, for a machine to satisfy this requirement it must in-
terpret well. 
The fourth sense of significance, namely, to refine existing theory, is equivalent 
to theoretical refinement, which we granted above is achievable for machines. 
In sum, to recognize and achieve significant solutions to theoretical social sci-
entific problems, the only crucial element that machines do not yet obviously pos-
sess is the capacity to interpret. Just as an ethnographer is able to interpret the sig-
nificance of the actions, questions, explanations, and so on, that she observes, the 
social scientific community is able to interpret the significance of the ethnog-
rapher’s results. 
The cognitive requirements for producing a novel, significant interpretation 
must therefore be a superset of the cognitive requirements for interpretation alone. 
Novelty and significance are features of interpretations and problems respectively, 
and they are attributed by interpretation. If we want to uncover the cognitive re-
quirements of producing a novel, significant interpretation, therefore, we will be 
off to a good start if we can identify the requirements for interpretation in general. 
3.3 Ethnographic Interpretation 
We can identify three main interpretive methodologies: analytic induction, 
grounded theory and the extended case method.4 
To pursue analytic induction we produce claims of universal generality that we 
aim to refute using particular cases, over and over, until only one irrefutable uni-
versal explanation remains. To reach this final end point (if it was also a novel so-
lution to a significant theoretical problem) would be to discover. However, since 
we could never establish that any universal statement was forever immune to fu-
ture disconfirmation (Katz 2001), more recent versions of analytic induction have 
4 For a statement of analytic induction, see Znaniecki (1934) and Lindesmith 
(1947). For statements of grounded theory, see Glaser and Strauss (1967), Corbin 
and Strauss (1990), Glaser (1978), Strauss (1987), and Strauss and Corbin (1990). 
For statements of the extended case method, see Burawoy (1998, 1991, 2000). In 
what follows, I try to distil the methods of ethnographic interpretation, but I can-
not do them complete justice. Interested readers are encouraged to look at the 
sources listed for more details. 
                                                          
10  
relaxed this requirement, and focus more generally on the method of hypothesis 
and counterexample. The role of interpretation in analytic induction is to turn data 
into counterexamples and to determine how to refine theory to avoid those coun-
terexamples. 
Grounded theory, in its strongest (and original) form, claims that theory must 
come from data and never the other way around. An often-quoted phrase is: “An 
effective strategy is, at first, literally to ignore the literature of theory and fact on 
the area under study, in order to assure that the emergence of categories will not 
be contaminated by concepts more suited to different areas” (Glazer and Strauss 
1967, 37). As with analytic induction, criticism has softened grounded theory over 
time. For example, Strauss (one of the theory’s originators) came to admit that it is 
not realistic to think we could generate theory purely from data and data alone 
(Strauss and Corbin 1994, 277). The main idea is now something like the follow-
ing. As much as possible, we must try to let themes and patterns present them-
selves to us instead of imposing existing categorizations and theoretical assump-
tions on our data. Then, we test the emerging notions against future observations 
and interviews, until we feel sure we have understood them correctly. The relevant 
notion of interpretation here is complicated, and we will return to it in a moment. 
In the extended case method, the emphasis is on extending and developing the-
ory through qualitative methods. Given some background theory, a researcher en-
ters the field with a host of specific hypotheses inspired by theory. Fieldwork is 
then “a sequence of experiments that continue until one’s theory is in sync with 
the world one studies” (Burawoy 1998, 17-18). Things not relevant to the back-
ground theory and initial set of questions can and should be ignored.  
On a loose reading, these methodologies are not mutually exclusive. One can 
begin with a theory in mind to inform an investigation (as in the extended case 
method), but look for empirical counterexamples (as in analytic induction) and be 
ready to create new conceptual resources as necessary (as in grounded theory). 
However, the extended case method and analytic induction produce new interpre-
tations in the senses of theory extension and refinement respectively. What we re-
ally want are cases where new theoretical understanding is born from the data. 
This is the promise of grounded theory. 
A great deal has been written on the process of interpretation in grounded theo-
ry. In general terms, 
 
You get from data, topics, and questions, on the one side, to answers or propo-
sitions, on the other, through intensive immersion in the data, allowing your da-
ta to interact with your disciplinary and substantive intuition and sensibilities as 
these latter are informed by your knowledge of topics and questions. (Lofland 
et al. 2006, 198-199)  
 
This kind of interpretation “occurs continuously throughout the life of any 
qualitatively oriented project” (Miles and Huberman 1994, 10). It begins with cod-
ing the data, which is “the process of defining what the data are all about” (Char-
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maz 2001, 340) or “relating (those) data to our ideas about them” (Coffey and At-
kinson 1996, 45-47) by “sorting your data into various categories that organize it 
and render it meaningful from the vantage point of one or more frameworks or 
sets of ideas” (Lofland et al. 2006, 200). The codes themselves are “names or 
symbols used to stand for a group of similar terms, ideas, or phenomena” 
(LeCompte and Schensul 1999, 55), “tags of labels for assigning units of meaning 
to information complied” (Miles and Huberman 1994, 56) or just “the labels we 
use to classify items of information as pertinent to a topic, question, answer, or 
whatever” (Lofland et al. 2006, 200).  
Once some codes are established, we move to “focused” coding. One way to do 
this is to sort the codes into units and aspects, which combine into topics. The unit 
is the scope of the sample (Lofland et al. 2006, 122-132), for example, a practice 
(like getting ready for work), an episode (like divorce), an encounter (like a cock-
tail party), an organization (like a school), or a larger community (like a refugee 
camp). An aspect of a unit might be the beliefs, norms, ideologies, emotions, rela-
tions, etc., of the people in the unit. These combine to form a topic (e.g., the faith 
of people in a sports team or the norms governing drug dealers). Topics should 
emerge and change naturally as the ethnography progresses.  
These reflections ready us for writing “memos,” which are “the intermediate 
step between coding and the first draft of your completed analysis” (Charmaz 
2001, 347). This is where we generate and develop possible explanatory relation-
ships between data (organized in codes) and the topic. Again, coding and mem-
oing must be done simultaneously with the data collection process, so that ideas 
can be brought back to the field, tested and updated.  
But how do we select units and aspects and generate meaningful codes and 
memos? “Field researchers too rarely elaborate how they get from their data, top-
ics, and questions to their findings and conclusions. The result is a kind of ‘black 
box’ or…‘analytic interruptus’… between the data-gathering and writing phases 
of the fieldwork enterprise that contributes to the sense that qualitative analysis is 
often the result of a mystical process or romantic inspiration” (Lofland et al. 2006, 
211). While we can identify the parts or milestones of this process (coding, mem-
oing, etc.), there still appears to be some extra cognitive leap that is left un-
described. And this is why, admitting that some parts of this process can be per-
formed by machines, Lofland et al. claim that data interpretation “is not a process 
that can be farmed out to independent analysts nor…to computers and various 
software programs” (2006, 196). 
Why not? I think it has to do with interpreting well, as opposed to merely inter-
preting. Perhaps a machine can select units, aspects and topics, generate codes 
from data, and organize the codes into answers about a topic. But the thought 
might be that a machine cannot do this well. Interpretation can be a simple act of 
rule-governed categorization, but it can also be one of the most difficult cognitive 
acts that an agent can perform, requiring creativity, patience, imagination and in-
sight. Perhaps it is some of these underlying cognitive powers that ethnographers 
suspect are missing from machines. In the next section, we will try to identify 
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some of the cognitive powers that make the most difficult acts of interpretation 
possible. 
 
4 Machine Interpretation 
Building on the work of Peter Winch (1958) and Charles Taylor (1971) I will ar-
gue that there are at least five abilities any agent must possess in order to interpret 
well. I leave out abilities like collecting data and performing calculations, which I 
take machines to have. 
To begin with, explaining human social behaviour requires that we discern the 
meanings of utterances and actions. And this requires that we recognize the possi-
bility of certain behaviours having meanings at all. A statement isn’t just the pro-
duction of a sound wave; it is also the expression of a thought. Following from 
this, a machine must have at least the following two abilities: 
 
1) It must be able to distinguish between the presentation of a datum and the 
meaning of that datum when such a difference obtains.  
 
When someone says “I’m fine,” they present themselves as being fine. They 
might also mean that they are fine. But they might not. If we always assumed that 
speakers meant exactly what they said, no additional sense could ever be made. 
So, for a machine to discover in ethnography it must make this distinction and be 
able to recognize cases where presentation differs from meaning. 
 
2) Once this distinction is made and instances are identified in which meaning 
(seems to) differ from presentation, an interpreter needs a method for determin-
ing meaning.  
 
We do not need to overcome the indeterminacy of translation or interpretation 
here; partial interpretation or partial grasp is perfectly fine in ethnography as an 
intermediate step towards understanding. But some way of getting from presenta-
tion to meaning is necessary, perhaps by means of a principle of charity and some 
informed guesses (Stuart 2015). This is especially difficult where metaphors, loose 
speaking, body language or implicature in general are involved.  
Next, meaning is only ever meaning for. There are no absolute meanings, or 
meanings in vacuo. An action might have one meaning for the actor, and a totally 
different meaning for the researcher, who looks at it in a different way. Because of 
this, 
 
3) An interpreter must be able to identify the subject for whom something has a 
given meaning. 
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Without being able to say who means what, a machine interpreter cannot inter-
pret, not least because the properties of the specific agent are needed to inform the 
interpretation. 
To understand human behaviour we must understand not only the meanings at-
tributed by actors to events and objects, but also the purposes for which actions 
are performed and the normative constraints that govern those actions (Winch 
1958, 77). This is necessary if we are to give a full explanation of any behaviour: 
the purpose of intentional action is to achieve some end, which is desired for some 
reason. Therefore, in order to perform ethnographic interpretation,  
 
4) An interpreter must be able to tell the difference between actions performed 
intentionally and unintentionally, and identify what the reasons for action are. 
 
Sometimes we can discover someone’s intentions simply by asking. But to in-
terpret the answers we receive again requires knowledge of intention, because we 
must know whether our subject intends to be deceptive before we can consider 
taking their answers at face-value. In other words, to uncover someone’s inten-
tions by asking, we must already be able to interpret intentions. A second difficul-
ty is that we cannot determine what a subject intends based on observation alone. 
Contributions of irrationality and luck must be recognized, otherwise, we interpret 
a gambling addict as intending to lose money, and people acting under cognitive 
biases in general as intending to ignore pertinent evidence or deceive themselves.  
Finally, 
 
5) An interpreter must observe and track the differences between their 
worldview and the worldviews encountered in the field.  
 
To understand someone, we must allow that they might not mean what we 
mean, see things as we do, desire what we desire, attribute the same level of im-
portance to the same things, and so on. Because of this it is crucial for ethnog-
raphers to know what their own worldview is, so that they can tell when and how 
it informs their interpretation of the worldviews under study. “Do they mean A by 
B, or do I only think so because A is what I would mean by B?”  
In sum, we have five abilities required for an agent to interpret in the most dif-
ficult cases of ethnographic discovery: the ability to 1) distinguish presentation 
from meaning, 2) identify meaning, 3) identify the “owner” of a meaning, 4) iden-
tify reasons for behaviour (while leaving room for irrationality and luck), and 5) 
distinguish, track and translate worldviews. There are surely other relevant abili-
ties, but at least these five are necessary. 
Can machines possess these abilities? Instead of pretending to know what fu-
ture machines will be capable of, I want to say what they would have to be like if 
they were to possess them. Specifically, I want to argue that each ability requires 
at least the faculty of imagination. Imagination has no commonly accepted defini-
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tion, but the basic idea is the ability to interact cognitively with objects and states 
of affairs not currently present to experience. Let’s go in order.  
1) To distinguish between presentation and meaning, an agent must recognize 
that there are always several possible meanings we could attribute to any given 
presentation (and vice versa). Such recognition requires looking beyond the 
presentation, in other words, we must conjure and consider states of affairs not 
currently present to experience. To distinguish between the statement “I’m fine” 
and the actual meaning someone intends with that statement, we must be able to 
imagine that the person could mean different things by that statement. 
2) To identify meaning, the machine must be able to present to itself options for 
semantic ascription other than what is immediately inferable from the data alone, 
and choose the best option. Sometimes this is a straightforward practice that could 
be made algorithmic. But at some point we hit bedrock, and to break through we 
require a special sort of experience and acquaintance. Consider an emotion term 
like “shame.” This 
 
can only be explained by reference to other concepts which in turn cannot be 
understood without reference to shame. To understand these concepts we have 
to be in on a certain experience, we have to understand a certain language, not 
just of words, but also a certain language of mutual action and communication, 
by which we blame, exhort, admire, esteem each other. In the end we are in on 
this because we grow up in the ambit of certain common meanings. But we can 
often experience what it is like to be on the outside when we encounter the feel-
ing, action, and experiential meaning language of another civilization. Here 
there is no translation, no way of explaining in other, more accessible concepts. 
We can only catch on by getting somehow into their way of life, if only in im-
agination. (Taylor 1971, 13) 
 
In other words, many basic pieces of the human semantic puzzle can only be 
grasped by taking part in common actions, values and experiences. Such participa-
tion is ultimately the source of many of our own meanings (Winch 1958, 81ff), 
though as Taylor mentions, this participation can also take place in imagination. 
For example, I possess many important concepts that I could not have gained 
through actual participation in the home-world of those concepts, because those 
worlds are fictional or in the past. It is therefore only through exercises of imagi-
nation that some instances of semantic understanding can be had, and this will be 
especially true for machines that cannot (yet) experience many of the things hu-
mans do. In any case, even when we have all the relevant experience, we still need 
to be able to come up with reasonable guesses about what someone means, and 
find ways to test those hypotheses (Stuart 2015). And this requires imagination 
because to test hypotheses we must imagine different experimental setups (in non-
trivial cases) and decide which would be more effective for testing by reasoning 
through possible outcomes of these tests. In other words, we must reason through 
states of affairs that do not (yet) exist. 
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3) To identify the owner of a meaning, the machine must be capable of taking 
up the perspective of an agent to see if a given meaning attribution is reasonable. 
Taking up a different perspective requires a cognitive departure from our present 
experience of objects and events, and this requires imagination.  
4) The only way to identify someone’s intentions (without being told what they 
are) is to imagine that you have the personal and contextual properties of the 
agent, and then ask yourself what reasons you would have for acting if you were 
them. In other words, the ability to interpret others depends both on the ability to 
interpret yourself (Jackman 2003) – which requires seeing that your own mental 
actions have more than one possible meaning – and the ability to convert yourself 
mentally into an approximation of someone else. Both of these abilities were dis-
cussed above, and both require imagination. 
Finally, 5) tracking the differences between one worldview and another and es-
tablishing semantic links that would enable translation between them requires ex-
perience of both worldviews. However we can only occupy one substantial 
worldview at a time (otherwise we would have to attribute conflicting properties 
to the same object). So to determine and compare worldviews, we must be able to 
distance ourselves from our current worldview, get into another, and then switch 
back and forth to make comparisons. And this requires presenting the same ob-
jects and events to ourselves from different perspectives, which is to cognize ob-
jects and states of affairs otherwise than they are given to us. 
Imagination is what enables us to recognize that there are several options for 
what someone might mean, hypothesize a number of plausible candidates, choose 
ways to test those candidates, and participate in the otherwise inaccessible action-
worlds of others and thereby gain new concepts. It helps us put ourselves in an-
other’s position or worldview by seeing ourselves acting under different con-
straints with some of our existing properties strengthened, and others diminished 
or removed. Each of the five abilities needed to interpret in difficult cases requires 
cognitive interaction with objects and states of affairs not currently present to our 
experience. Imagination is therefore a fundamental capacity underlying ethno-
graphic interpretation. 
5 Conclusion 
I have discussed the possibility of ethnographic machine discovery and I have ar-
gued that interpreting human behaviour and natural language systems of meaning 
requires imagination. A fortiori, imagination is necessary for producing some of 
the novel interpretations that solve significant problems in social science. There-
fore, some discoveries in social science are only possible if the discoverer pos-
sesses imagination. This implies that for machines to be able to discover in social 
science to the same extent that humans can, they will require imagination algo-
rithms. 
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Could such algorithms exist? That is, could a machine cognitively interact with 
objects and states of affairs that are not currently available to their “experience”? 
In some senses, yes. Computers can propose counterfactual hypotheses to make 
certain inferences. Logic software does this for reductio ad absurdum proofs and 
conditional derivations. But this is not the same as entertaining something that is 
not present, e.g., something fictional, since in the case of the logic program, the 
machine is interacting only with symbols that are present to its “experience.”  
Concerning more substantial senses of imagination, like those required for per-
spective shifting, things are murkier. I conclude therefore on what I think is a sur-
prising note. The necessary conditions for scientific discovery (conceived of as an 
action) include providing novel interpretations that solve significant theoretical 
scientific problems, and in order to say whether machines can produce all such in-
terpretations in principle, we first need a better understanding of the imagination 
and what cognitive powers are required for its operation. Unfortunately, philoso-
phers and cognitive scientists are still very far from possessing such an under-
standing.  
To conclude, those who feel skeptical or optimistic about the extent to which 
machines can discover in science should focus that skepticism (or optimism) on 
the nature and possibility of imagination algorithms. And to do this in a detailed 
way, we require a better understanding of the nature and cognitive requirements of 
imagination in humans, and imagination in general. 
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